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UNIVERSITY OF-MIAMI LAW REVIEW
THE DEMISE OF THE-STANDARD UNINSURED MOTORIST
POLICY EXCLUSION
The plaintiff, while riding on an uninsured motorcycle owned by his
mother, was struck and injured by a motorist who carried no automobile
liability insurance. The plaintiff's father carried automobile liability
insurance, issued by defendant State Farm Insurance Company, which
covered all the members of his household. Although this insurance pro-
vided for uninsured motorist coverage, it contained an express exclusion
from such coverage for bodily injury sustained by an insured person
while occupying an uninsured vehicle, which was owned by the named
insured or any member of his household. Plaintiff sought recovery based
on his uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court ruled that the policy,
by its terms, expressly excluded the uninsured motorist coverage claimed
by the plaintiff. The District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed on
appeal. The Supreme Court of Florida, on conflict certiorari review,
held, reversed: Uninsured motorist coverage is intended by statute to
provide the mutual equivalent of automobile liability coverage, and no
policy exclusions contrary to the statute are permissible. Mullis v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971).
Uninsured motorist coverage in Florida is governed by Florida
Statutes section 627.0851 (1969).' No automobile liability insurance can
be issued in Florida unless it provides coverage for the protection of those
insured for injury caused by uninsured motorists.2 This coverage, how-
ever, may be declined by the named insured."
When interpreting an automobile liability insurance policy, the
court will follow the definitions and terms found in the policy itself.4
Unambiguous language in the policy requiring no special construction or
interpretation will be given the meaning it clearly expresses. 5 However,
the provisions of a policy which tend to limit or avoid liability are to be
construed most strongly against the insurer.6
In the past, standard uninsured motorist exclusions, such as the
one in the instant case, were relatively free from controversy. In recent
years, however, several types of coverage exclusions have been held in-
valid by the Florida appellate courts as contrary to the intent of Florida
Statutes section 627.0851." The principle of law which invalidates these
1. The statute is commonly referred to as the Uninsured Motorist Statute.
2. Such coverage cannot be less than the minimum insurance required for automobile
liability insurance policies by FiA. STAT. § 324.021(7) (1969): (1) $10,000 per accident for
bodily injury or death of one person (2) $20,000 per accident for bodily injury or death to
two or more persons and (3) $5,000 for destruction of property of others in any one
accident. Coverage in these amounts must be provided in the policy for those legally. entitled
to recover damages from an uninsured motorist. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851(1) -(1969).
3. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851(1) (1969).
4. Dorrell v. State Fire & Cas. Co., 221 So.2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
5. Valdes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co, 207 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
6. Carter v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 219 So.2d 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
7. See First Natl Ins. Co. v. Devine, 211. So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) (exclusion from
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exclusions, as expressed in Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Gavin,8
is that:
Insurance companies are without power to insert provisions in
the policy which would restrict the coverage afforded by the
policy in a manner contrary to the intent of the statute.9
Florida's public policy concerning uninsured motorist insurance is
established in Florida Statutes section 627.0851. Each insured who car-
ries uninsured motorist coverage will be protected to the same extent he
would have been, had the offending motorist maintained a minimum
liability insurance policy.'
This policy was exemplified in a recent case involving an insured
driver, who was covered by uninsured motorist protection. The insured
driver was run off the road and injured by a hit-and-run driver. The
plaintiff was unable to prove the offending motorist was, in fact, unin-
sured. The insurance policy contained a standard uninsured motorist
exclusionary clause, which restricted the insurer's liability in hit-and-run
cases to instances of proven physical contact or lack of insurance. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the standard exclusionary clause was
void as against public policy, since it attempted to restrict the coverage
required by Florida Statutes section 627.0851."1 Consequently, a person
injured by a hit-and-run driver may now recover under uninsured mo-
torist coverage without being required to prove that the offending motor-
ist had no insurance or that there was physical contact. The only
requirement is that the offending motorist have no insurance available
for the protection of the injured party.' 2
Although in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Webb"1 the
First District apparently retreated from its earlier attack on exclusion-
ary clauses, 4 its position was clearly delineated in the subsequent case
of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Powell. 5 "[i] t is not the -intent of the
statute to limit coverage to an insured by specifying his location or the
particular vehicle he is occupying at the time of injury."' 6
class of insured those under age 25) ; Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. 'v. Mason,.210 So.2d
474 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). (partial exclusion of coverage as to certain vehicles); Davis v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 172 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) and Zeagler v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (in actions for wrongful
death of insured, clauses limiting the right to bring the action).
8. 184 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
9. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
10. Davis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 172 So.2d 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
11. Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1971).
12. Id.
13. 191 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966). An exclusionary clause similar to the one in
Mullis was held valid; as a result, uninsured motorist coverage was denied. The court stated
that the purpose of the exclusion was to indicate that additional uninsured motorist coverage
could be purchased to cover the situations affected by the exclusion.
14. See notes 7 and 8 supra and accompanying text.
15. 206 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968). The court held an exclusionary clause similar
to the one in Mullis to be an "invalid restriction" contrary to FLA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1967).
16. 206 So.2d at 246.
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The law in other jurisdictions is clear that an exclusionary clause
similar to the one in Mullis will be considered as having no effect.' 7
Until the First District Court held in Mullis that the exclusionary
provisions in the policy effectively limited the insurer's liability, 8 the
law in Florida appeared to be settled that uninsured motorist policy
exclusions were ineffective and void as against public policy.' 9 In order
to clarify the situation, the Florida Supreme Court in Mullis20 addressed
itself not only to the specific exclusion at bar, but stated in explicit terms
that:
Whenever bodily injury is inflicted upon named insured or in-
sured members of his family by the negligence of an uninsured
motorist, under whatever conditions, locations, or circumstances,
any of such insureds happen to be in at the time, they are
covered by uninsured motorist liability insurance issued pur-
suant to requirements of Section 627.0851.21
The underlying justification for the court's sweeping opinion in
Mullis is that the Uninsured Motorist Statute was intended to provide
uniform and specific insurance benefits to innocent persons injured by
the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Such benefits are fixed by
statute and are not to be "whittled away" by exclusions and exceptions
inserted by insurers into the policies they issue.2' The parties are pre-
sumed to have entered into the insurance agreement with reference to
the statute. Thus, the statutory provisions become a part of the insuring
agreement.23
The Uninsured Motorist Statute applies differently to two classes
of insureds. The class of the named insured and relatives residing in his
household are covered at all times, while all others are covered only if
they are injured while occupying an insured vehicle with the permission
or consent of the named insured. Since the plaintiff in the instant case
belonged to the first class, he was intended by the statute to be covered at
17. See Vaught v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 413 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1969) ; Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1067, 83 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1969); Gulf Am. Fire & Cas.
Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga. App. 286, 154 S.E.2d 411 (1967); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 207
Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222 (1967).
18. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 231 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), relying
on the Webb case, note 13 supra, for its authority. The conflict in the instant case arose
because Webb was apparently overruled by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in
Powell, note 15 supra, and several other subsequent cases.
19. See note 7 supra and accompanying text; Butts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
207 So.2d 73 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Forbes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 210 So.2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1968) (exclusion from protection while occupying public conveyance); National Serv. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 204 So.2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (exclusion from coverage while
standing outside vehicle).
20. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971).
21. Id. at 233.
22. Id. Accord, First Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Devine, 211 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
23. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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all times. Thus, the clause which attempted to limit the insurer's liability
to the plaintiff was an invalid limitation of coverage. 4
Considering the number of decisions which have negated exclusion-
ary provisions,", it would appear that the Mullis case is merely an ex-
pected extension, and clarification of the law. However, the decision in
the instant case has far more impact than mere clarification of existing
law. The Supreme Court of Florida made it clear that no policy exclu-
sions of any manner contrary to the intent of the Uninsured Motorist
Statute are permissible.
Insurers or carriers writing automobile liability insurance and
reciprocal uninsured motorist insurance are not permitted by
law [Florida Statutes section 627.0851] to insert provisions
in the policies they issue that exclude or reduce the liability cov-
erage prescribed by law for the class of persons insured there-
under ... 2
Although an analysis of no-fault insurance 27 is clearly beyond the
scope of this note, it is obvious that beginning January 1, 1972, unin-
sured motorist coverage will not apply where first party benefits are
payable under no-fault insurance. However, Mullis will still have a
highly significant effect in the area of automobile insurance for two im-
portant reasons: 1) there are many areas which are not covered by no-
fault insurance 28 and 2) Mullis is not limited to uninsured motorist
coverage. The thrust of the case is that it will serve as a standard for
the courts to apply in interpreting any insurance policies written pur-
suant to statute, including the No-Fault Statute. The Supreme Court of
Florida in Mullis made it clear that any terms in an insurance policy
which are contra to the intent of a governing statute will be rendered
void by the courts.
It is, therefore, ironic that the No-Fault Statute contains an express
statutory exclusion from coverage 29 that is strikingly similar to the con-
tractual exclusion held invalid in Mullis. The instant case still clearly
24. Mullis v. State Farm Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971).
25. See notes 7 and 17 supra and accompanying text.
26. Mullis v. State Farm Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229, 234 (Fla. 1971).
27. See Fla. Laws 971, ch. 252.
28. Id. The following are sonte of the areas excluded from coverage in the new No-Fault
Statute: (1) all vehicles which are' not four-wheel motor vehicles (2) all public livery con-
veyances for passengers (3) vehicles used primarily in the occupation, profession or business
of the insured. Fla.,Laws 1971, ch. 252, § 3. Further, an injured party can bring an action
against the defendant for pain and suffering where (1) medical costs exceed $1000 or
(2) the injury consists of any of the following: (a) permanent disfigurement (b) a fracture
of a weight-bearing bone (c) loss of body member (d) a compound fracture (e) permanent
injury within reasonable medical probability (f) permanent loss of a body function (g)
death. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 252, § 8(2).
29. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 252, § 7(2)(a) provides that any insurer may exclude
benefits: "For injury sustained by the named insured and relatives residing in the same
household while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured and not
insured under the policy ....
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dictates that insurance policies must comply with public policy. However,
because of the apparent conflict between the No-Fault Statute and the
Uninsured Motorist Statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Mullis, it is unclear exactly what the present public policy is concern-
ing the specific exclusion of coverage in the instant case.
STEPHEN G. FISCHER
CIVIL RIGHTS: ARE PRIVATE CONSPIRACIES REDRESSABLE
IN FEDERAL COURTS?
Petitioners, Negro citizens of Mississippi, filed an action for damages
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Missis-
sippi. The complaint alleged that respondents, certain white citizens of
Mississippi, conspired to assault the petitioners, who were traveling upon
the highways of Kemper County, Mississippi, near the Mississippi-
Alabama border. Petitioners further alleged that, pursuant to the con-
spiracy, the respondents, mistakenly believing the driver of petitioners'
vehicle to be a civil rights worker, blocked their passage on the public
highways, and, threatening murder, forced them from the car and inflicted
serious physical injury by clubbing them while holding them at gunpoint.
Petitioners sought to invoke federal jurisdiction under the language of
42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).' The District Court dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Collins v. Hardyman,2 in
which 42 U.S.C. section 1985 (3) was construed as reaching only con-
spiracies under color of state law.' The Court of Appeals affirmed,4 and
certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court of the United States held, re-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1965) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy
set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or depri-
vation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
2. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
3. The standard definition is found in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941):
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color
of state law.
In cases involving civil rights, "under color" of law has been consistently equated with the
"state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Hampton v. City of Jackson-
ville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
4. Griffin v. Breckinridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
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